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n September 7th, five weeks after the 
European Central Bank (ECB) started 
buying Spanish bonds as part of its 
Securities Market Programme, and four weeks 
since Merkel and Sarkozy announced their 
proposal of writing debt limits into national laws, 
the Spanish Parliament has approved a 
constitutional reform that, by constraining the 
general government’s spending and borrowing 
capacity, aims to mitigate concerns over public 
finances. This reform, the second since the current 
Constitution was enacted by referendum in 1978, 
has been made possible by an agreement between 
the ruling socialists (PSOE) and the main 
opposition party (conservative PP).  
Undoubtedly, any effort aimed at introducing 
mechanisms that help limit the arbitrary nature of 
fiscal policy should be welcomed.  At the same 
time, it is encouraging that Spain’s two major 
parties (accounting for 92% of the seats in the 
Parliament’s lower house) have reached such an 
historical agreement in such a short period of 
time. Political unity will be a precondition for 
successfully tackling the challenges the Spanish 
economy currently faces.  
The constitutional reform consists of two parts, 
each with different beneficiaries and effects over 
time. First, a debt limit has been introduced in the 
Constitution. Second, interest and principal 
payments have been given explicit priority over 
any other expenditure. In the former case, the 
beneficiaries are the Spanish citizens, who are 
now better protected against the whims and 
caprices of the ruling parties.  In the latter case, 
beneficiaries are the creditors who, knowing that 
their claims will be the first be paid out of the 
public coffers, will demand lower risk premiums 
on their loans to the Spanish state.  In addition, 
the phasing of each of the two measures is 
different: While the first one will not come into 
effect until 2020, the second measure should have 
an immediate impact. 
 





The debt limit is twofold. First of all, the Spanish 
Constitution’s new amendment imposes a direct 
limit on the absolute level of the general 
government’s debt (Art. 135.3.3º). Such a limit 
will be determined by the "reference value 
established by the Treaty on the Functioning 
of  the European Union" – currently at 60% of 
GDP.  Indirectly, debt dynamics will also be 
constrained by a limit on the general 
government’s structural budget deficit 
(Art. 135.2). While the details of the Organic Law 
needed to develop this constitutional provision 
(to be passed before the end of June 2012) still 
have to be worked out, socialists and 
conservatives have already agreed on a 
maximum structural deficit of 0.4% of GDP. In 
any case, deficits will also be tied to the "margins 
established by the European Union" – currently at 
3% of GDP for the non-cyclically-adjusted 
balance.1 
                                                      
1 EU limits on both debt and non-structural deficits are 
established in Art. 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
Reform of the Spanish Constitution 
Old Article 135
∗ 
1.  The Government must be authorised by law in order to issue Public Debt bonds or to contract loans. 
2.  Loans to meet payment on the interest and capital of the State's Public Debt shall always be deemed to be included in 
budget expenditure and may not be subject to amendment or modification as long as they conform to the terms of issue. 
New Article 135
∗ 
1.  All public administrations will conform to the principle of budgetary stability.  
2.  The State and the autonomous communities may not incur a structural deficit that exceeds the limits established by the 
European Union for their member states. 
An Organic Law shall determine the maximum structural deficit the state and the autonomous communities may have, in 
relation to its gross domestic product. Local authorities must submit a balanced budget.  
3.  The State and the regions must be authorised by law in order to issue Public Debt bonds or to contract loans. 
Loans to meet payment on the interest and capital of the State's Public Debt shall always be deemed to be included in 
budget expenditure and their payment shall have absolute priority. These appropriations may not be subject to 
amendment or modification as long as they conform to the terms of issue. 
The volume of public debt of all the public administrations in relation to the State’ gross domestic product may not exceed 
the benchmark established by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
4.  The limits of the structural deficit and public debt volume may be exceeded only in case of natural disasters, economic 
recession or extraordinary emergency situations that are either beyond the control of the State or significantly impair the 
financial situation or the economic or social sustainability of the State, as appreciated by an absolute majority of the 
members of the Congress of Deputies. 
5.  An Organic Law shall develop the principles referred to in this article, as well as participation in the respective 
procedures of the organs of institutional coordination between government fiscal policy and financial support. In any 
case, the Organic Law shall address:  
a.  The distribution of the limits of deficit and debt among the different public administrations, the exceptional circumstances 
to overcome them and the manner and time in which to correct the deviations on each other.  
b.  The methodology and procedure for calculating the structural deficit. 
c.  The responsibility of each public administration in case of breach of budgetary stability objectives.  
6.  The autonomous communities in accordance with their respective laws and within the limits referred to in this article 
shall take the appropriate procedures for effective implementation of the principle of stability in their rules and budgetary 
decisions.  
New Additional Provisions (NAPs) 
1.  The Organic Law, as provided for in Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, must be approved before June 30, 2012. 
2.  Such law shall provide mechanisms for compliance with the debt limit referred to in Article 135.3. 
3.  Structural deficit limits set forth in Article 135.2 of the Spanish Constitution shall come into force in 2020. 
____________ 
∗ While the old article’s translation is official, the translation of the new one is ours, based on the text approved by the 
Senate (higher house) on 7 September 2011.  SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM | 3 
 
The rules are given some flexibility by 
introducing a number of circumstances in which 
the limits may be breached (Art. 135.4): i) natural 
disasters, ii) economic recession and iii) situations 
that “significantly impair” financial stability or 
the “economic or social sustainability of the 
State”. In our view:  
‐  This opt-out clause should have been 
excluded from the reform since it is broad 
enough so as to erode the rules’ credibility. 
Also, despite the fact that Art. 135.4 requires 
support from an “absolute majority of the 
members of the Congress of Deputies”, we 
think this is just a mere formality; at the end 
of the day, any Government will always have, 
de facto, the support of an absolute majority of 
the Congress.2 
‐  The first circumstance (“natural disasters”) is 
redundant. Art. 116 of the Constitution on the 
‘states of emergency’ already grants the 
Government the power to temporarily restrict 
(and even suspend3) individual liberties and 
fundamental rights in exceptional cases such 
as, for example, natural disasters.4 Therefore, 
an argumentum a fortiori holds since “he who 
can do more, can do less”. 
‐  The reference to “economic recession” as an 
exceptional circumstance should, at the 
minimum, be removed. Since the limit set by 
Art. 135.2 is on the ‘structural’ (rather than on 
                                                                                          
the European Union (TFEU) and in Art. 1 of the Treaty’s 
Protocol No. 12. 
2 Generally, either a Government has an absolute majority 
de jure (i.e. the ruling party’s MPs account for, at least, 
50% + 1 of the seats in the Congress) or has to ‘trade’ for 
support with other minor regional parties. A minority 
Government that, on a regular basis, was unable to reach 
agreements with other parties would be likely forced to 
call early elections. 
3 According to Art. 55.1 of the Constitution, “The rights 
enshrined in Articles 17, 18, paragraphs 2 and 3; Articles 19, 
20, paragraphs 1, a) and d), and 5, Articles 21 and 28, 
paragraph 2, and Article 37, paragraph 2, may be suspended 
when the states of emergency or siege are declared under the 
terms established in the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 17 
is exempted from the foregoing in the event of declaration of 
state of emergency.” 
4 According to Art. 4.a) of the Organic Law 4/1981, 
‘natural disasters’ (“Catastrophes, public calamities or 
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires or urban large-
scale accidents”) is one of the circumstances that would 
justify the declaration of the ‘state of alarm’ by the 
government. 
the non-cyclically-adjusted) budget deficit, 
then this value already embeds an adjustment 
for any potential cyclical deviations. In other 
words, a recession should be no excuse for 
increasing structural spending. Note that, 
otherwise, the Constitution would be 
explicitly allowing the Government to repeat 
in the future exactly the kind of behaviour 
that this reform aimed at preventing in the 
first place!  
‐  Structural budget balances are, by their 
nature, fraught with uncertainty since they 
are not observable and have to be estimated. 
Consequentially, unless a consistent 
methodology is specified for the estimation 
(and conducted by an independent entity 
such as Eurostat), governments will have the 
incentive during cyclical booms to ‘cheat’ 
with the adjustment and make extra spending 
appear the least structural as possible. 
‐  Finally, the last circumstance (“extraordinary 
emergency situations that are either beyond the 
control of the State or significantly impair the 
financial situation or the economic or social 
sustainability of the State”) is, admittedly, a 
black-box in which almost anything can fit. In 
our opinion, the Organic Law should narrow 
this circumstance’s meaning down to 
‘financial instability’, while clearly defining 
the conditions (and procedures) for public 
interventions in the financial sector. Ideally, 
this should be done in parallel with the 
development of alternative ways (e.g. bank 
resolution regimes5) to cope with the orderly 
restructuring of banks in case of crises. 
At the same time, one of the greatest 
achievements of the reform has been to extend 
both the debt and deficit limits to the regions 
(Art. 135.6) as well as to impose a balanced 
budget on the local authorities (Art. 135.2.2). That 
said, we think the limits should have also been 
extended to all public corporations.  In other 
words, limits should apply to the ‘public sector’ 
as a whole and not just to the ‘general 
government’.6 In the absence of transparent and 
                                                      
5 See, e.g. Alexander et al. (2009). 
6 According to the standard methodology used for 
government finance statistics, while the ‘general 
government’ (the usual measure against which 
consolidation targets are set and fiscal performance is 
evaluated) involves all levels of government (state, social 4 | ABAD & HERNÁNDEZ GALANTE 
 
effective limits on the general government’s 
capacity to increase its off-balance sheet activities, 
this reform might well lead to an uncontrolled 
rise in contingent liabilities. 
Overall, while certainly positive from an 
institutional perspective, the fact that none of the 
two limits will be binding before 2020 (NAP no. 
3 )  m a k e s  t h i s  p a r t  o f  the reform relatively 
innocuous. It is, therefore, surprising that the 
spotlight is on this part of the constitutional 
reform rather on the “absolute priority” given to 
public debt service. 
Absolute priority to debt service 
In our view, the inclusion of an explicit reference 
to the “absolute priority” of debt service 
payments (Art. 135.3.2º) represents the most 
interesting change coming out of the recent 
reform. By de facto eliminating the possibility of a 
default by any of the public administrations, it is 
– we think – the part of the reform with the 
biggest potential to both mitigate investors’ 
concerns over the Spanish government’s ability to 
service its debt and also to minimise contagion 
effects. Fiscal problems would become sovereign 
political problems and not threats to the stability 
of the monetary union (Cooley & Marimón, 2011). 
We believe that explaining and publicising this 
measure, with the same emphasis with which the 
fiscal rules have been announced, would result in 
investors lowering their expectations of default 
risk. We think prioritising debt service payments 
(and doing so in a credible way) has the potential 
to stabilise government bond yields at current 
levels and relieve the ECB of the need to 
intervene in secondary markets through its 
Securities Market Programme.  A lower cost of 
capital for the State should result in better 
financing conditions for the private sector as 
well.  
In fairness, it should be said that the old Art. 
135.2 (new Art. 135.3.1º and 2º) of the Spanish 
Constitution already gave, implicitly, absolute 
priority to debt service over other expenditures. 
According to its standard interpretation (see 
Jiménez Díaz, 2003), this article established the 
presumption that the funds required to meet 
                                                                                          
security, regions and local authorities), it excludes public 
corporations. The ‘public sector’ measure would fill this 
gap by adding public corporations’ balance sheets to the 
general government’s balance sheets (see IMF, 2001). 
public debt’s interest and principal payments 
would always be included in the State’s budget. 
Furthermore, the article also contained an 
absolute prohibition on the modification or 
amendment of the appropriations needed to meet 
these payments, provided they complied with the 
terms of issue.  
That said, the old Art. 135.2 had – in our view – 
two major flaws: First of all, the “absolute 
priority” could be inferred from the text but was 
not explicitly stated in it;7 and second, the 
mechanisms for making such “absolute priority” 
credible were lacking. While the current reform 
has solved the former, we urge policy-makers to 
address the latter. The Organic Law that, 
according to Art. 135.5, will regulate the details of 
the reform, could also be used to incorporate 
enforcement mechanisms into the institutional 
framework. In our view, making credible the 
“absolute priority” given to debt service requires 
two conditions:  
‐  Ex ante, the obligation to include contingency 
plans in the budget of each year. Each 
administration should take into account (as 
well as publicly report) the measures to be 
taken, in case deviations of macroeconomic 
variables from the assumptions under which 
the budget was built undermine that 
administration’s ability (or willingness) to 
repay its debt.   
‐  Ex post, in the case that the (central, regional 
or local) government does not follow its 
contingency plan, it would be necessary to 
devise an extremely brief procedure that 
allowed a minority of the Congress (regional 
parliament or local council) to enforce its 
implementation.  
Mitigating tail-risks 
As we have tried to highlight, we do think 
Spain’s recent constitutional reform (specially the 
part on which neither politicians nor the media 
are putting the spotlight) has the potential to stop 
the bleeding observed in funding markets. 
However, we cannot stress enough the 
importance of designing and implementing 
                                                      
7 The fact that, to our knowledge, there has been no 
judgement from the Constitutional Court on this article’s 
implications, creates some uncertainty with regard to 
how fiscal authorities would actually interpret it. SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM | 5 
 
enforcement mechanisms that make the reform 
credible. In the absence of such mechanisms, not 
only Spain might be losing a unique opportunity 
for fundamental reform, but it might also be 
running the risk of further undermining the 
credibility of its institutions. Moreover, we think 
the recent reform could help address two of the 
major tail-risks investors are concerned with.  
1. The ‘Irish scenario’ 
Despite the proven resiliency of Spanish banks 
throughout the crisis,8 concerns over their 
potential losses and capital needs still linger. On 
the back of such concerns, some commentators 
have even suggested the possibility that Spain 
might suffer the same destiny as Ireland where 
the government has been forced to assume the 
liabilities of the banking system. We do think 
such claims are exaggerated9 and believe the 
                                                      
8 According to De Nederlandsche Bank (2011), 
government support (i.e. capital injections as well as asset 
relief and debt guarantee measures) to financial 
institutions in Spain were – by far – the lowest out of a 
sample of nine countries, including the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Spain, the UK, the US 
and Switzerland. Data were as of 1 August  2010. 
9 Explaining why – we think – the Spanish banking 
system is, fundamentally, far more robust than the Irish 
one, would exceed the purpose of the present note. It 
should nevertheless suffice to enumerate five key 
differences between the two:  
(i)  Size. While bank assets of Irish banks accounted for 
800% of GDP at the end of 2009, Spanish banks’ 
assets accounted for just around 300% of GDP, in line 
with other euro area countries like Germany or 
France. 
(ii)  Concentration. In Ireland, problems were concentrated 
in just a few banks (i.e. in the six main Irish banks 
whose liabilities were fully guaranteed by the Irish 
State in 2008). In contrast, the problem of the Spanish 
banking sector is one of over-capacity – troubled 
assets are much more widely spread out. 
(iii) Clean-up. Apart from the counter-cyclical provisions 
built-up during the years prior to the crisis, Spanish 
banks have undergone a process of catch-up 
provisioning since its start (for details, see Roldán, 
2011). Since early 2008, Spanish banks have increased 
provisions by €100 billion and equity by €50 billion, 
and it is expected that these figures will also rise to 
€70 billion and €20 billion, respectively, over the 
course of 2011-12 (Recarte, 2011). At the end of 2012, 
total clean-up would amount to around €250 billion 
or 25% of the Spanish GDP. 
(iv) Regulations by the Banco de España are, in general, 
stricter than those of other European regulators. In 
recent constitutional reform – if credibly 
implemented – should help mitigate such 
concerns. 
Art. 135.4 of the Constitution includes ‘financial 
stability’ (“extraordinary emergency situations which 
(...) significantly impair the financial situation”) as 
one of the exceptions in which the government is 
allowed to deviate from the debt limit imposed 
by Art. 135.3.3º. That is, should the Spanish 
government judge that a bank (or a group of 
banks) poses a threat to the country’s financial 
stability, the Constitution would grant it 
permission to raise debt levels beyond the limit in 
order to finance a particular government support 
programme. The question is, therefore, whether 
the Constitution provides any guidance with 
regard to the maximum extent of any such 
intervention. We think it does. According to Art. 
135.3.2º (absolute priority to debt service 
payments), the government may default on its 
debt only after it has already foregone other 
spending commitments (pensions, public 
servants’ wage bill, education, healthcare, etc.). If 
credible – for which the adequate enforcement 
mechanisms are still lacking – this article should 
create the incentives for fiscal authorities to 
devise, as we suggested above, alternative ways 
(such as bank resolution regimes) to cope with 
the orderly restructuring of banks in case of 
crises.  
The ‘hard limit’ set by debt service’s absolute 
priority should be the key rule constraining any 
time-inconsistency in fiscal policy. The Spanish 
government might raise as much debt as it 
wished to, provided it i) complied with the 
enforcement mechanisms in place, and ii) was 
willing to internalise voters’ attitudes towards 
                                                                                          
fact, even though the same terms are normally used 
to make cross-country comparisons, they actually 
refer to different concepts (reflecting cross-country 
differences in financial regulation). In short, for the 
same core tier 1 capital ratio, a Spanish bank will 
generally be better capitalised than a non-Spanish 
bank. 
(v)  House prices. Growth in house prices in Spain 
evidenced a lower over-valuation component than in 
other countries. According to the IMF (2008), while 
the percentage increase that is not attributable to 
fundamentals was over 32% in Ireland, it was just 
around 17% in Spain (in line with other countries 
such as Sweden and Belgium). 6 | ABAD & HERNÁNDEZ GALANTE 
 
spending cuts going forward.10 In this sense, we 
believe Art. 135.3.2º will prove more effective in 
setting the right incentives than relying on how 
policy-makers  decide to interpret the exceptions 
included in Art. 135.4 of the Constitution. 
Identifying such exceptions is a difficult task even 
for trained economists, so leaving the judgement 
to politicians would introduce even more 
arbitrariness and special interests into the 
process. We should not forget that PM Zapatero 
and his cabinet explicitly denied the existence of 
the crisis itself until July 2008... and even labelled 
those MPs, businessmen and economists urging 
them to take measures and reforms as “anti-
patriots”!  
2. The ‘Hungarian risk’ 
Some may argue that, even with adequate 
enforcement mechanisms in place, the 
constitutional reform would not exclude the risk 
that the government could decide – as we have 
recently seen in Hungary – to nationalise all 
private pension assets in order to pay down the 
debt while giving people pay-as-you-go promises 
instead. In our view, however, it would precisely 
be the presence of “adequate enforcement 
mechanisms” – like the ones outlined above – that 
would rule such a risk out. 
First and foremost, given the prominent role 
played by pension funds in financial markets, 
dismantling the private pension system would 
adversely affect liquidity in both bond and equity 
markets. Lower demand for public bonds at a 
time of higher funding needs would necessarily 
result in much higher (likely unaffordable) 
interest rates. As a result, Art. 135.3.2º of the 
Constitution (debt service priority) would force 
every level of the general government to 
implement cuts in order to meet debt service 
payments. The mere thought of having to explain 
to voters why the expropriation of their savings 
also led to a higher cost of capital that is forcing 
them to cut a number of social expenditures 
should discourage fiscal authorities from taking 
such a measure in the first place. Furthermore, 
                                                      
10 At the end of the day, it is unlikely that politicians will 
acknowledge to their voters that today’s spending cuts 
are the result of yesterday’s irresponsible spending 
decisions. That said, it is not very difficult to think of 
government officials blaming the previous 
administrations! 
given that the pay-as-you-go promises would 
have a lower level of security than the general 
government debt, people should prefer 
government bonds held in pension schemes to 
government pension promises and therefore 
would feel defrauded in case the nationalisation 
did actually happen.11 
Second, even if the higher fiscal revenues derived 
from such nationalisation temporarily offset the 
deterioration of access to wholesale funding 
markets, two consequences would be 
unavoidable: Firstly, the additional cyclical 
revenues would encourage increased spending 
and deteriorate the general government’s 
structural deficit, undermining the credibility of 
the limit set by Art. 135.2 of the Constitution;12 
and secondly, the cost of capital to the private 
sector – via equity and private bond markets – 
would remain unaffordable.  
Overall, given the relatively low level of general 
government debt in Spain (63.6% of GDP as of the 
1st quarter of 201113), it is not at all clear that the 
benefits of a lower stock of debt would outweigh 
the negative impact of this measure on the State’s 
fiscal position (flow), and on its cost of capital in 
particular, through any of – or all – the channels 
we have just discussed. The most likely result 
would be a multi-notch downgrade of the 
Spanish Government’s credit rating.14 
Conclusion 
Finally, note that, although with the potential to 
stop the bleeding, even the credible 
implementation of these measures would not be 
                                                      
11 In Hungary, assets of equal value and priority were 
swapped with the only loser being the next generation 
being saddled with opaque debt. 
12 To avoid this, fiscal authorities in Brussels and Madrid 
should put as much emphasis on structural targets as 
they seem to be putting on non-structural ones. An 
example of what should have been avoided is the 
rescheduling of corporate tax payments recently 
announced by the Spanish government. Ceteris paribus, 
this one-off measure will increase this year’s revenues by 
an amount equal to how much they will decrease in the 
next one. It might help meet this year’s target (a non-
cyclically-adjusted general government deficit of 6% of 
GDP), but at the cost of forcing the government coming 
out of the November general elections to implement an 
even tougher consolidation programme in 2012. 
13 Data from the Banco de España. 
14 For Hungary’s case, see Hornung et al. (2011). SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM | 7 
 
sufficient to reactivate the patient's vital signs. It 
is imperative that the constitutional reform, 
which undoubtedly represents in itself a major 
step forward and sends a very positive signal to 
the outside, is integrated within a more ambitious 
programme of structural reforms, with special 
emphasis on areas such as the labour market and 
the tax system. The ultimate goal should be to 
reduce the rigidities inherent in the Spanish 
economy, improve the country’s competitiveness 
and mitigate the legal and institutional 
uncertainty that currently surrounds Spain. 
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